{"id":97,"date":"2018-03-14T12:33:41","date_gmt":"2018-03-14T12:33:41","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/holli.co.uk\/philblog\/?p=97"},"modified":"2018-03-14T12:33:41","modified_gmt":"2018-03-14T12:33:41","slug":"phenomenal-properties","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.holli.co.uk\/philblog\/phenomenal-properties\/","title":{"rendered":"Phenomenal properties: do they even exist?"},"content":{"rendered":"

David Chalmers has made available an early draft of a new paper, \u2018The Meta-Problem of Consciousness<\/a>\u2019, in which he addresses two topics. First, he sets out the meta-problem: why is it that we find explanations of phenomenal experience problematic? Second, he considers the claim that phenomenal consciousness is some form of introspective illusion, as exemplified in Keith Frankish\u2019s recent paper \u2018Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness<\/a>\u2019 (see this interesting blog review<\/a> by Peter Hankins).<\/p>\n

Reading these papers by Chalmers and Frankish, one after the other, highlighted two areas where it seems easy to talk at cross purposes. I\u2019ll start with phenomenal properties<\/em> …<\/p>\n

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The description of phenomenal properties that Chalmers provides in his earlier writings is quite straightforward: he refers simply to \u2018those properties that characterize conscious states according to what it is like to have them\u2019 and emphasizes that this definition involves no further substantive requirements, such as intrinsicality (2010, p. 104; see also 1996, p. 359). We might term this a minimal<\/em> conception of a phenomenal property, and it is reflected in one of Chalmers\u2019 comments in his recent draft paper: \u2018To generate the hard problem of consciousness, all we need is the basic fact that there is something it is like to be us. We do not need further claims about intrinsicness, nonphysicality, and so on\u2019 (2018, p. 31).<\/p>\n

Of course, it is obvious from his writings taken as a whole that Chalmers believes that phenomenal properties are<\/em> intrinsic and nonphysical. So why adopt this minimal definition? The reason is this: in order for his arguments against materialism to be effective, they must not assume at the outset<\/em> some form of ontological divide between the phenomenal and the physical. As he says near the beginning of The Conscious Mind<\/em>, \u2018At this early stage, I do not wish to beg any questions about whether the phenomenal and the psychological will turn out to be the same thing\u2019 (1996, p. 12). Instead, Chalmers takes conscious experience as a phenomenon that is in need of explanation<\/em>: \u2018The main intuition at work is that there is something to be explained\u2014some phenomenon associated with first-person experience …\u2019 (1996, p. 110).<\/p>\n

It is precisely because he adopts this minimal definition of a phenomenal property that Chalmers is able to force the materialist between Scylla and Charybdis: either they account for those familiar epistemic gaps (of explanation, knowledge, conceivability), or else they have to reject conscious experience even as a phenomenon in need of explanation<\/em> \u2013 which, suggests Chalmers, is to \u2018deny the manifest\u2019 (2010, p. 112).<\/p>\n

For my part, I have no difficulty accepting phenomenal properties on this minimal conception, on the grounds that having an experience with (e.g.) a greenish aspect is different from having an experience with a reddish aspect, and that whatever it is<\/em> that differs in respect of those experiences qualifies as a phenomenal property on Chalmers\u2019 definition. I am therefore perfectly happy to refer to experiences as being characterized<\/em> in qualitative terms \u2013 such as \u2018greenish\u2019 or \u2018reddish\u2019. However, I maintain that Chalmers\u2019 definition of phenomenal properties does not ipso facto <\/em>mean that experiences cannot be biological processes: one can surely characterize<\/em> an experience as \u2018reddish\u2019 even if that experience turns out to be constituted by certain neurological activities in the brain.<\/p>\n

Frankish, on the other hand, is having none of it … and in his article on illusionism he categorically repudiates the existence of phenomenal properties. Here\u2019s one reason he gives (2016a, p. 26) for this rejection: \u2018Phenomenal properties must not merely cause representations of phenomenality but have some genuinely \u201cfeely\u201d aspect to them. And it is unclear what this could be. What phenomenal residue is left, once features such as privacy, intrinsicality, and ineffability have been stripped away?\u2019 I can see the point here, but it doesn\u2019t seem to me to be decisive. In particular, the illusion<\/em> that experiences involve intrinsic, ineffable properties does still have what Frankish refers to as a \u2018feely aspect\u2019; for example, my experience when I look at the sky on a clear day surely has an aspect to it that I characterize as \u2018bluish\u2019. Renouncing even this<\/em> does appear to open one up to the objection that one is denying the manifest.<\/p>\n

I believe that for Frankish, the decisive reason for rejecting phenomenal properties in toto <\/em>is that if we do not, then we will still face those familiar epistemic gaps, and the hard problem will bite us just as forcefully as it ever did:<\/p>\n

But while I do not deny that we may be able to provide reductive accounts of many aspects of conscious experience, I doubt that these will be sufficient to justify realism about phenomenal properties in anything like the traditional sense. My worries centre on explanatory gaps. While identities may be initially inferred on the basis of partial explanations, we expect to be able to render them intelligible, giving reductive explanations of higher-level properties in terms of more basic ones. Why should consciousness be an exception, especially when the feature that resists explanation is such a central one? (2016b, p. 282)<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

While I am sympathetic towards Frankish\u2019s uncompromising materialist attitude, I fear that his approach to phenomenal properties is problematic in two respects. First, as I have already noted, it leaves him wide open to the claim that he is denying the manifest. As Chalmers bluntly puts in his draft paper: \u2018I think illusionism is obviously false, because it is obvious that people feel pain\u2019 (2018, p. 35). Second, I believe that by attempting to neutralize the epistemic gaps, it diverts attention away from the real<\/em> causes of those gaps (<\/em>see \u2018<\/em>The Possibility of Materialism<\/a>\u2019)<\/em>.<\/p>\n

Of course, Frankish understands perfectly well that he needs to meet the objection that he is denying that consciousness exists. He attempts to do this by distinguishing between (i) phenomenal properties, and (ii) experience<\/em> \u2013 a term which he says he will use \u2018in a functional<\/em> sense, for the mental states that are the direct output of sensory systems\u2019 (2016a, p. 13, emphasis added). But this reference to \u2018functional\u2019 brings us to the second area where confusion needs to be avoided, which will require a separate post …<\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n

References:<\/strong><\/p>\n

David Chalmers (1996) The Conscious Mind<\/em><\/p>\n

David Chalmers (2010) The Character of Consciousness<\/em><\/p>\n

David Chalmers (2018) \u2018The Meta-Problem of Consciousness\u2019 (version 2), draft paper available at https:\/\/philarchive.org\/rec\/CHATMO-32<\/a><\/p>\n

Keith Frankish (2016a) \u2018Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness\u2019, Journal of Consciousness Studies<\/em> 23<\/strong>:11\u201312, pp. 11\u201339<\/p>\n

Keith Frankish (2016b) \u2018Not Disillusioned: Reply to Commentators\u2019, Journal of Consciousness Studies<\/em> 23<\/strong>:11\u201312, pp. 256-289<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

David Chalmers has made available an early draft of a new paper, \u2018The Meta-Problem of Consciousness\u2019, in which he addresses two topics. First, he sets out the meta-problem: why is it that we find explanations of phenomenal experience problematic? Second, he considers the claim that phenomenal consciousness is some form of introspective illusion, as exemplified … <\/p>\n

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