1: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION
As the year 2000 grew nearer, there seemed to develop a distinct end-of-an-era feel
to many writings on social and political matters (Francis Fukuyama even wrote a book
entitled - rather prematurely - The End of History and the Last Man). Much of this
could be put down to the approaching end of the millennium, and to the decline of
communist states in the USSR and Eastern Europe, but there was also a growing sense
that intellectual culture had reached some sort of dead-end, a critical point that
left much of the West's philosophic, scientific, and cultural development over the
last few hundred years in doubt, but which failed to suggest any new way forward.
One book that caught this fin de siecle mood was Richard Tarnas's The Passion of
the Western Mind (1991), a narrative of the development of Western thought from the
pre-Socratic Greeks to postmodernist thought, via medieval Christianity and the scientific
revolution of the seventeenth and following centuries. By charting the major trends
within this history, Tarnas was able to provide a suggestive account of the development
of the aforementioned sense of intellectual crisis. If we were to try to summarize
Tarnas, we might identify three major strands that contribute to this sense that
'the very project of Modernity ... seems to have lost momentum, and we need to fashion
a successor program' (Toulmin 1990, p. 3).
Firstly, modern Western thought has been perceived to be more self-consciously rational
than earlier periods or other cultures.1 There have of course been strong trends
with a different outlook, such as the Romantic movement originating in Rousseau and
finding perhaps its strongest proponent in Goethe, but the rational, mathematicized
intellectual approach taken by early proponents such as Descartes, in philosophy,
and Galileo, in physics, represents the major trend in Western thought since the
first half of the seventeenth century. Yet such an approach now looks to have become,
in a sense, self-defeating - there appear to be strong reasons for believing that
a coherent and logical understanding of the world, and of humanity's place in it,
is simply not a possibility. Various elements can be adduced to support this conclusion.
Descartes' own confident philosophy was soon developed in a more doubting direction
by successors such as Locke and Berkeley, culminating in David Hume's outright skepticism
concerning our ability to be certain of any conclusion at all. Various attempts to
reconstitute our ability to know what is true, such as those of Kant or Hegel, have
ultimately been seen as failures, albeit possibly heroic failures. In addition, our
modern, rational, scientific society is now seen as being itself determined in non-rational
ways: for example, by economic factors (Marx), by unconscious psychological factors
(Freud), or by cultural factors (Kuhn). Our intellectual self-confidence has been
affected by an increased knowledge of social and cultural history, and of societies
other than our own, and hence by the realization that our own culture is just one
of many that have grown and then declined during human history. Finally, there is
the sobering effect of the discovery that the universe as described by physics -
the doyen of our rational sciences - dwarves us in terms of time and space, and is,
in the case of quantum physics, strange beyond our comprehension.
Secondly, this emphasis on the rational appears to have been at the expense of other
attributes such as the 'emotional, aesthetic, ethical, volitional, ... imaginative,
[or] epiphanic' that had previously helped mediate the relationship between an individual,
society, and the world. Such meaningful categories had permeated the pre-modern world,
but rationalistic thinking has tended to dismiss them as merely anthropomorphic projections
(Tarnas 1991, pp. 287, 326).
Thirdly, the belief that science provided its own justification in terms of the benefits
of improved health, more material goods, and so on, was eroded during the twentieth
century by a variety of factors: two world wars and the development of nuclear and
biological weapons; a growing perception that capitalist societies were characterized
by greed and unnecessary consumption, and socialist societies by bureaucracy and
restrictions on pluralism; the effect of economic growth on the environment; the
failure to eradicate poverty in many third-world countries; and a sense that individuals
in economically developed societies were prone to a growing sense of alienation -
from themselves, from society, and from the world around them. This sense of alienation
forms the everyday counterpart to what Tarnas (1991, p. 419) describes as a threefold
intellectual displacement: a cosmological estrangement initiated by Copernicus, an
ontological estrangement due to Descartes, and an epistemological estrangement via
Kant.
I don't intend to recapitulate in any further detail the developments that have led
to our current situation, whether they be philosophic, scientific, cultural, or social.
Others have already written excellent accounts; Tarnas, for example, provides an
exemplary overview, and Stephen Toulmin's book Cosmopolis (1990) details the historical
context of the development of philosophical and scientific modernism, and the growth
of those doubts about its efficacy that eventually led to the postmodernist milieu.
I will be taking most of this for granted; the series of notes that follow will instead
be predicated on the the following:
(i) First of all, I will accept the view that we are currently in an 'era between
eras' (Tarnas 1996), in the sense that the sensibility forged in the seventeenth
to nineteenth centuries appears to be subject to a problematic that renders a strong
modernist revival improbable, yet where the trends of thought that have contributed
to its demise appear unlikely to be maintained as a stable intellectual and cultural
status quo. The current ethos is, as Tarnas suggests, 'one of disassembling established
structures, deflating pretensions, exploding beliefs, unmasking appearances - a "hermeneutics
of suspicion" in the spirit of Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud' (Tarnas 1991, p. 401). The
very basis of earlier attempts to improve civilization is seen as (i) subject to
its own criticisms and hence in a way self-defeating, and (ii) having helped produce
the type of society that is now seen by many as inhuman and totalizing (and hence
totalitarian). Thus, the critique of modernist ways of thought seems to have led
to a decline in constructive and optimistic social criticism during the second half
of the twentieth century, to be replaced by what might be termed 'oppositionalism'.
But if rational criticism keeps undercutting itself, then we are left in an impasse
without sight of an exit.
(ii) Accordingly, what we need to do is (to use a phrase from Mao) 'let a thousand
flowers bloom'. Our present aim should be to cultivate different ways of looking
at ourselves and the world, rather than attempting to show that we have the correct
description or theory.2 In the text that follows, I shall therefore be trying to
extract relations and linkages from a variety of writings over the last few decades.
I will not be too concerned with the possibility of deconstructive criticism of those
ideas - my aim is to develop some form or pattern of concepts that can be of use
in changing our ways of thinking and our behaviors, rather than simply repeating
criticisms of earlier views.3 As such, much of what follows is necessarily speculative
and subject to an ad hoc development. It is certainly not intended to be viewed as
foundationalist or as a totalizing system of thought.
(references should be to: http://www.holli.co.uk/introduction.htm)
First version created: June 2004
Last updated: July 2005
Notes:
[1] In Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity (1990), Stephen Toulmin describes
how the use of the term 'rational' seems to have changed during the last few hundred
years. From Descartes on, Western philosophy has emphasized an abstract, formal approach
that considers matters independent of context, rather than 'reasonable procedures'
of various types that apply to different sorts of concrete situations, and has thereby
subtly redefined the meaning of 'rational'. In effect, the scope of rational thought
contracted, rather than expanded, during the seventeenth century. This separation
of rationality and logic from the emotions and rhetoric represented a move back from
the more 'humanist' philosophy of the Renaissance, as realized in Shakespeare, Erasmus,
and Montaigne. According to Toulmin, there were strong political and cultural reasons,
deriving from the religious arguments and wars that followed the Reformation and
counter-Reformation, why writers in the seventeenth century emphasized a desire for
certainty above all else.
[2] I am therefore also committed to avoiding the opposite temptation, which is to
merely keep repeating as a form of mantra 'there is no correct description or theory'.
[3] Given this approach, I concentrate on recent thinkers, rather than those without
whom we could not have reached our current position, such as Descartes, Kant, Hegel
or Marx.
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