THE POSSIBILITY OF MATERIALISM

Mike Holliday

June 2016

References

Austin, J.H. (1998) Zen and the Brain, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Alward, P. (2004) Is phenomenal pain the primary intension of ‘pain’?, Metaphysica, 5 (1), pp. 15-28.

Balog, K. (2012) In defense of the phenomenal concept strategy, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1), pp. 1-23.

Block, N. (2006) Max Black's objection to mind-body identity, Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, 2, pp. 3-78.

Block, N. (2015) The Canberra Plan neglects ground, in T. Horgan, M. Sabates & D. Sosa (eds.) Qualia and Mental Causation in a Physical World: Themes from the Philosophy of Jaegwon Kim, Cambridge University Press.

Block, N. & Stalnaker, R. (1999) Conceptual analysis, dualism, and the explanatory gap, Philosophical Review, 108 (1), pp. 1-46.

Byrne A. (2010) Inverted qualia, in Zalta E.N. (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2010 edition), [Online], http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2010/entries/qualia-inverted/ [8 Dec 2013].

Carruthers, G. & Schier, E. (2014) Why are we still being hornswoggled? Dissolving the hard problem of consciousness, Topoi, Advance online publication: DOI http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11245-014-9266-3.

Carruthers, P. (2004) Reductive explanation and the ‘explanatory gap’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 34 (2), pp. 153-174.

Carruthers, P. & Veillet, B. (2007) The phenomenal concept strategy, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 14 (9-10), pp. 212-236.

Chalmers, D.J. (1995) Facing up to the problem of consciousness, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2 (3), pp. 200-219.

Chalmers, D.J. (1996) The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory, Oxford University Press.

Chalmers, D.J. (1997) Moving forward on the problem of consciousness, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 4 (1), pp. 3-46.

Chalmers, D.J. (1999) Philosophy 596B: mind and modality (spring 1999), week 2 discussion, [Online], http://consc.net/class/596b/week2.txt [21Oct 2014].

Chalmers, D.J. (2002a) On sense and intension, Philosophical Perspectives, 16 (s16), pp. 135-182.

Chalmers, D.J. (2002b) Does conceivability entail possibility?, in T.S. Gendler & J. Hawthorne (eds.) Conceivability and Possibility, Oxford University Press.

Chalmers, D.J. (2003) The content and epistemology of phenomenal belief, in Q. Smith & A. Jokic (eds.) Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives, Oxford University Press.

Chalmers, D.J. (2004) Response to Perry's reply, [Online], http://consc.net/papers/perry.html#response [21 Oct 2014].

Chalmers, D.J. (2006) The foundations of two-dimensional semantics, in M. Garcia-Carpintero & J. Macia (eds.) Two-Dimensional Semantics, Oxford University Press.

Chalmers, D.J. (2010) The Character of Consciousness, Oxford University Press.

Chalmers, D.J. (2012a) Comment on ‘dissolving the hard problem of consciousness’, Consciousness Online fourth conference, [Online], http://consciousnessonline.com/2012/02/17/dissolving-the-hard-problem-of-consciousness/#comment-1365 [21 Oct 2014].

Chalmers, D.J. (2012b) Constructing the World, Oxford University Press.

Chalmers, D.J. & Jackson, F. (2001) Conceptual analysis and reductive explanation, Philosophical Review, 110 (3), pp. 315-361.

Churchland, P.M. (1996) The rediscovery of light, Journal of Philosophy, 93 (5), pp. 211-228.

Clark, A. (1993) Sensory Qualities, Oxford University Press.

Clark, T.W. (2005) Killing the observer, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 12 (4-5), pp.38-59.

Clark, T.W. (2010) Respecting privacy: why consciousness isn’t even epiphenomenal, [Online], http://www.naturalism.org/philosophy/consciousness/respecting-privacy [26 November 2015]

Damasio, A. (2010) Self Comes to Mind: Constructing the Conscious Brain, London: William Heinemann.

Deacon, T.W. (2012) Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter, New York: W.W. Norton & Company.

Dennett, D.C. (1991) Consciousness Explained, Boston, MA: Little, Brown.

Dennett D.C. (1993) The message is: there is no medium, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 53 (4), pp. 919-931.

Dennett, D.C. (2005) Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Dennett, D.C. (2012) Comments at the Moving Naturalism Forward conference, [Online]. Available on a video of the conference’s first session at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ju4C_ITlBsU [25 March 2016].

Diaz-Leon, E. (2010) Can phenomenal concepts explain the epistemic gap?, Mind, 119 (476), pp. 933-951.

Doyle, A.C. (1981) The Penguin Complete Sherlock Holmes, Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books.

Elpidorou, A. (2013) Having it both ways: consciousness, unique not otherworldly, Philosophia, 41 (4),  pp. 1181-1203.

Frankish. K. (2015) Something that it is like to be, Tricks of the Mind, [Online], http://www.keithfrankish.com/2015/04/something-that-it-is-like-to-be/ [14 April 2015]

Franklin, S. (1995) Artificial Minds, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Goff, P. (2011) A posteriori physicalists get our phenomenal concepts wrong, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 89 (2), pp. 191-209.

Graham, A.C. (1989) Chuang-Tzu: The Inner Chapters, London: Unwin-Hyman.

Güzeldere, G. (1997) The many faces of consciousness: A field guide, in N. Block, O. Flanagan & G. Güzeldere (eds.) The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Hardin, C.L. (1988) Color for Philosophers: Unweaving the Rainbow, Indianapolis: Hackett.

Henderson, R.W. (2014) Breaking the spell: materialism and the qualia intuition, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 21 (7-8), pp. 184-192.

Hilbert D.R. & Kalderon M.E. (2000) Color and the inverted spectrum, in S. Davis (ed.) Color perception: philosophical, psychological, artistic, and computational perspectives, Oxford University Press.

Hill, C.S. & McLaughlin, B.P. (1999) There are fewer things in reality than are dreamt of in Chalmers's philosophy, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 59 (2), pp. 445-454.

Holliday, M. (2005) Mirroring reality: how not to think about the world, [Online], http://www.holli.co.uk/metaphysics.htm [28 April 2015]

Humphrey, N. (1992) A History of the Mind, London: Vintage, paperback edition 1993.

Hutchinson, D. (2013) The origin of phenomenal consciousness: on the art of the ‘hard problem’, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 20 (1-2), pp. 126-152.

Jackendoff, R. (2012) A User’s Guide to Thought and Meaning, Oxford University Press.

Jackson, F. (1982) Epiphenomenal qualia, Philosophical Quarterly, 32 (4), pp. 127-136.

Jackson, F. (1986) What Mary didn't know, Journal of Philosophy, 83 (5), pp. 291–295.

Jonas, H. (1966) The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a Philosophical Biology, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, reprinted 2001.

Kriegel, U. (2009) Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory, Oxford University Press.

Levine, J. (2001) Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness, Oxford University Press.

Lewis, D. (1988) What experience teaches, Proceedings of the Russellian Society, 13 (1), pp. 29-57.

Loar, B. (1997) Phenomenal states, in N. Block, O. Flanagan & G. Güzeldere (eds.) The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Maturana, H.R. (1988) Ontology of observing: The biological foundations of self consciousness and the physical domain of existence, in Texts in Cybernetics (conference workbook), American Society For Cybernetics Conference, Felton, CA. 18-23 October 1988; available online at http://www.inteco.cl/articulos/004/texto_ing.htm [27 March 2016]

Nida-Rümelin, M. (1995) What Mary couldn't know: belief about phenomenal states, in T. Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience, Exeter, UK: Imprint Academic.

Papineau, D. (2002) Thinking about Consciousness, Oxford University Press.

Papineau, D. (2006) Comments on Galen Strawson, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 13 (10-11), pp. 100-109.

Papineau, D. (2007) Phenomenal and perceptual concepts, in T. Alter. & S. Walter (eds.) Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, Oxford University Press.

Perry, J. (2001) Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Perry, J. (2004) Replies, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 68 (1), pp. 207-229.

Putnam, H. (1981) Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge University Press.

Putnam, H. (1987) The Many Faces of Realism, La Salle, IL: Open Court.

Putnam, H. (1988) Representation and Reality, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Putnam, H. (1999), The Threefold Cord: Mind, Body, and World, New York: Columbia University Press.

Rabin, G. (2011) Conceptual mastery and the knowledge argument, Philosophical Studies, 154 (1), pp. 125-147.

Rorty, R. (1979) Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Searle, J.R. (1992) The Rediscovery of the Mind, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Searle, J.R. (1997) The Mystery of Consciousness, London: Granta Books.

Smith, B.C. (1996) On the Origin of Objects, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Thompson, E. (2007) Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of the Mind, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Varela, F.J. (1997) Patterns of life: intertwining identity and cognition, Brain and Cognition, 34 (1), pp. 72-87.

Villela-Petit, M. (1999) Cognitive psychology and the transcendental theory of knowledge, in J. Petitot, F. Varela, B. Pachoud & J-M. Roy (eds.) Naturalizing Phenomenology: Issues in Contemporary Phenomenology and Cognitive Science, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Weatherson, B. & Marshall, D. (2012) Intrinsic vs. extrinsic properties, in Zalta E.N. (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition), [Online], http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/intrinsic-extrinsic/ [19 Aug 2015].

Yablo, S. (1999) Intrinsicness, Philosophical Topics, 26, pp. 479-505.